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Abstract 
Changes in economic direction in Britain in the twentieth century were incremental, rarely 
permanent, and strongly contested, although related trends to deindustrialisation, widening 
inequality and the ostracism of trade unions from policy-making were clear by the mid-1980s. This 
followed the defeat of the striking miners in 1984-85, a decisive movement, certainly, in macro-
economic direction. This case study of the Scottish coalfields uses generational analysis to illuminate 
the contested nature of these long-running economic changes. Three distinct trade union generations 
are identified, linked to successive ideal-types of economic unit. Each represented an ever larger 
economy of scale, and qualitative changes in coalfield employment: ‘Village Pits’, ‘New Mines’, and 
‘Cosmopolitan Collieries’. The evolving organisation of production, combined with other powerful 
experiences in early adulthood, formed different political goals for each successive generation. The 
first, born in the 1890s, won the primary goal of nationalisation in 1947; the second, born in the 
1920s, secured important changes to the manner in which the nationalised industry operated in the 
1960s, applying greater workforce control and securing enhanced communal economic security; the 
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third, born in the 1950s, attempted to defend the social democratic elements of the nationalised 
order in the 1980s against changing macro-economic strategy and micro-managerial operations 
which threatened pits, jobs and worker voice. Nationalisation, it is shown, was a success from the 
perspective of the workforce, but only because trade unions compelled the National Coal Board and 
the UK government to preserve economic security in the coalfields. These victories of the 1960s were 
over-turned, however, by the Conservative government in the 1980s, at massive cost to coalfield 
communities and workers. 
 
It has long been assumed that there were two decisive changes in economic direction in Twentieth 
Century Britain. According to this interpretation, the 1945–51 Labour governments consolidated and 
extended developments set in train by Winston Churchill’s war-time coalition towards an enlarged 
state, with greater interventionist powers, which manipulated demand through fiscal policy. This 
path was followed, more or less, by all subsequent administrations until 1979, at which point the 
Conservative governments led by Margaret Thatcher initiated a radical and permanent reverse in 
policy, scaling back the state and abandoning Keynesian demand management.1 This stark account 
of two periods of dramatic change has been refined in recent years by scholarship which, in 
examining the complex and contested nature of long-term change, has drawn attention to important 
continuities in government approaches. Thus governments in the 1930s made significant 
‘corporatist’ interventions to stimulate aggregate demand, which anticipated the limited Keynesian 
‘revolution’ that followed the Second World War.2 In this sense, the Conservative Party’s adaptation 
to the post-1945 ‘mixed’ economy of greater state intervention and ‘full’ employment was not 
transformational. Nor was it wholesale.3 Meanwhile, the ‘neoliberal’ turn under Thatcher’s 
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leadership had long-established roots, nourished by contacts between elite Conservative Party 
activists, business leaders and economic thinkers from the 1950s onwards.4 Moreover, the changes 
from 1979 cannot be characterised as a completely permanent revolution in Britain’s economic 
orientation: the Thatcher years were followed in the 1990s by interventionist and expansionist 
policies pursued by Conservative and then New Labour governments.5 
For all the greater emphasis on continuity in recent scholarship, a clear shift in economic 
direction after 1979 can nevertheless be discerned if we focus on two related elements of economic 
management: income distribution and the commitment to maintaining high levels of employment. 
The Gini coefficient is a standard measure of income distribution, usually expressed as a figure 
between 0 and 1, rising as the scale of inequality increases. In Britain the Gini coefficient in 1938 was 
0.42. After the Second World War it narrowed, to 0.24 in 1961 and 0.23 in 1977, but then jumped to 
0.34 in 1987. It has subsequently plateaued at this upper level.6 Such a sharp widening of inequality 
was the direct result of government changes to fiscal, budgetary and social security policy, but also 
reflected the abandonment of the state’s commitment to high levels of employment. The planned 
innovations of the 1940s, marking a clear dividing line from the inter-war years of persistent and 
heavy unemployment, had shaped Britain’s economic direction from the 1950s to the 1970s, but 
were abandoned in the 1980s. A key development was deindustrialisation, slowly developing, if 
watchfully managed, in the 1960s and 1970s, but allowed to accelerate rapidly after 1979. The 
consequent loss of relatively well-paid manual jobs in industrial sectors was the largest single cause 
of the major increase in unemployment in the 1980s, and reinforced the sudden growth of income 
                                                          
4
 B. Jackson, ‘The Think-Tank Archipelago: Thatcherism and Neo-Liberalism’, in B. Jackson and R. Saunders, 
eds., Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 43–61; N. Rollings, ‘Cracks in the Post-War Keynesian 
Settlement? The Role of Organised Business in the Rise of Neoliberalism before Margaret Thatcher’, Twentieth 
Century British History, xxiv (2013), pp. 637–59 
5
 J. Tomlinson, ‘Tale of a Death Exaggerated: How Keynesian Policies Survived the 1970s’, Contemporary British 
History, xxi (2007), pp. 429–48. 
6
 A.B. Atkinson, ‘The Distribution of Income in the UK and OECD Countries in the Twentieth Century’, Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, xv (1999), pp. 56–75. 
4 
 
inequality. The state’s pursuit of employment creation recommenced only very partially in the 
1990s.7 
 The qualified picture of changes in economic direction in the 1940s and 1980s is illuminated 
by this case study of the Scottish coalfields, which covers two significant periods of reconstruction in 
the twentieth century. First, the privately-owned industrial order, where trade union influence was 
circumscribed by authoritarian management, gave way in the 1940s to a model of greater social 
partnership, with joint industrial regulation and public ownership. Second, in the 1980s there was re-
ordering of a different kind, characterised by anti-trade union management practices, market 
liberalisation, deindustrialisation and privatisation. It will be shown that these changes were gradual 
rather than abrupt, although there was nevertheless a clear trajectory from liberal order to social 
democratic order in the middle of the century, followed by a reversion to liberalism in the 1980s. 
These changes were shaped by multiple macro factors. The ownership and operation of the coal 
industry in Scotland as in England and Wales was influenced profoundly by long-term movements in 
UK government ideology and policy, as well as by the domestic and international political economy 
of energy.8 But human agency and popular pressure were also important. The emphasis here is on 
the role that generational change played in advancing the social democratisation of the coalfields in 
the middle of the twentieth century and then in resisting the reversion to liberalism in the 1980s. 
The process was long and contested, with fuzzy boundaries between the successive coalfield 
orders. An important staging-post was the nationalisation of coal in 1947. The Labour government 
elected in 1945 had a substantial trade union base. More than a quarter of its 393 MPs were 
sponsored by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), which had been an advocate of public 
ownership since before the First World War; the government nationalised coal in accordance with its 
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broader programme of progressive economic and social redistribution, with the result that income 
inequality narrowed markedly.9 The second reconstruction, in the 1980s, was structured by the 
Conservative governments’ commitment to dismantling the ‘world’ of 1945: empowering private 
interests, and eroding trade union influence in workplaces and society more generally.10 
Privatisation was a key expression of this distinct macro-economic approach. Margaret Thatcher, 
Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990, claimed that nationalised industries and utilities were 
inefficiently and illegitimately organised around the interests of producers rather than consumers. 
Some scholarly analysis of the post-1945 public sector reflects this thinking. Nationalised enterprises 
have often been characterised as economic failures, absorbing capital and labour resources that 
could have been more productively invested in the private sector. According to this line of argument, 
privatisation, combined with the removal of the trade union ‘veto’ on economic policy, contributed 
to the establishment of a more competitive economic environment. This, in turn, ostensibly 
stimulated productivity and macro-economic growth.11 There are, however, alternative perspectives. 
In the first instance, coal and other key strategic sectors were nationalised because of demonstrable 
market failure in the 1930s and 1940s, with the private sector proving to be incapable of supplying 
the necessary investment and scale economies in production.12 Second, it has been suggested that 
privatisation in the 1980s and 1990s of various branches of the energy, transport and 
telecommunications industries in fact yielded minimal productivity gains, 13 although this meagre 
improvement is explained in part by a drive to improved performance prior to sale.14 Meanwhile, 
although many private operators subsequently became highly profitable, the claim that consumer 
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interests were advanced is highly uncertain.15 Applying broader economic and social criteria, 
nationalisation—particularly of coal and the railways—can, in fact, be seen as both warranted by 
historical circumstances and highly successful in practice. It was part of the broader policy matrix 
that narrowed income inequality and increased provision of stable employment from the 1940s to 
the 1970s. The National Coal Board (NCB) supplied energy in quantities required by domestic and 
commercial users at stable prices; it was a relatively progressive employer, balancing production 
with significant improvements in health and safety; and, during a period of radical contraction in the 
1960s, it helped to ‘recycle’ hundreds of thousands of workers into the productive economy at 
minimal social cost.16 
 The analysis of the Scottish coalfields presented here shows that nationalisation and the 
general shift in economic direction in the middle of the twentieth century was nevertheless 
accompanied by only limited changes to everyday life in Britain, as experienced by working-class 
people. In The Uses of Literacy, published in 1957, Richard Hoggart famously examined the 
emergence of a classless mass culture, but noted also the distinct persistence of class-based 
inequalities and the related resilience of working-class identity.17 Recent literature reviewing the 
‘Affluent Worker’ debate of the 1960s, initiated by the well-known study of manual employees in 
three Luton factories,18 has likewise emphasised the partial and contested nature of improvements 
to working-class life. Exploring the contemporary analyses of left intellectuals in the 1940s and 
1950s, Alexandre Campsie has stressed continuities: in workplaces there was no move to greater 
employee involvement in the organisation of production; and class structures and privileges were 
undisturbed even by the Labour governments’ move to an expanded state with significant welfare 
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improvements and the nationalisation of key industries.19 Affluence itself is, in any case, highly 
problematic in class terms. Mike Savage and others have shown that improvement for manual 
workers remained dependent on the modest growth of wages from strenuous labour, secured only 
through bargaining with sometimes reluctant employers who jealously protected their workplace 
sovereignty.20 It will be shown here that progress for miners in Scotland was similarly circumscribed: 
nationalisation was a success, but only because trade union activism compelled the NCB and the UK 
government to make policy adjustments that preserved economic security in the coalfields. These 
developments highlighted the existence of a moral economy in the coalfields after 1947. This 
resembled that of E. P. Thompson’s eighteenth century plebeian crowd, with an emphasis on 
communal security in a period of disruptive economic change.21 As established pits closed and job 
losses mounted, especially from the late 1950s, policy-makers were obliged to consult mineworkers’ 
union and political representatives, and make provision for alternative economic activity: new mines 
were developed by the NCB and government-funded regional assistance stimulated the provision of 
different forms of industrial employment, most notably assembly manufacturing.22 
The analysis presented here relates the extent and manner of changes in economic direction 
to the formation and influence of three distinct trade union generations. The first, born in the 1890s, 
secured the miners’ primary goal of nationalisation; the second, born in the 1920s, was alive to 
defects in the nationalised order that the first generation could not see, and incrementally secured 
greater workforce control over the management of the industry from the late 1950s onwards; the 
third, born in the 1950s, attempted to defend this revised order in the 1980s. The movement from 
the private and liberal order to social democratic order in the coalfields was the result of the 
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successive efforts of these generations. This generational approach is adapted from Karl 
Mannheim’s theoretical model, first published in the 1920s, and draws on recent historical 
scholarship, including literature on coal miners in the Ruhr in the 1940s and 1950s.23 The formation 
and activism of the three mining generations are linked to gradual, but discernible, changes in the 
structure and scale of coal industry workplaces, as well as to movements in macro-economic 
direction. 
The argument has two parts. First, the initial operational difficulties of nationalisation in the 
Scottish coal industry are examined and related to the concept of generational change. The 
generational model itself is outlined and connected to the changing structures of the Scottish coal 
industry and mining workforce across the twentieth century. Second, the formative experiences of 
the distinct generations are scrutinised and the importance of industrial and workplace conditions is 
emphasised. The article brings together existing scholarly literature, employer and union records, 
including pit-level data from the 1950s to the 1980s, and miners’ memoirs, as well as interviews 
conducted by the author with members of the youngest of the three identified generations. 
 
[I] 
The coal industry workforce did not secure unambiguous economic and social improvement by the 
act of nationalisation in 1947. This had to be fought for. The NCB emphasised its commitment to ‘the 
health and safety of those they employ’,24 and there was significant progress in this area. From 1930 
to 1939 the average annual rate of death arising from accidents in Scottish coal mines was 0.48 per 
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 K. Mannheim, ‘The Problem of Generations’, in K. Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge 
(London, 1952), pp. 276–322, especially pp. 288–303; M. Roseman, Recasting the Ruhr, 1945–1958: 
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100,000 man shifts; from 1949 to 1958 the rate was 0.25.25 Joint industrial regulation was vital in 
securing this benefit, but the move to greater mechanisation produced elevated levels of dust in the 
mines. The dangers of respiratory diseases, notably pneumoconiosis, had been wilfully obscured by 
private owners in the 1920s and 1930s,26 and were only slowly acknowledged by the NCB after 
1947.27 Debates about safety were conducted at workplace level within a pattern of relations that 
remained fractious, not least because of the continuity of employment for managers and supervisors 
from the private regime. These frustrations, recently recalled by ex-miners from Durham and South 
Wales in Ken Loach’s film, The Spirit of ’45,28 partly arose because the NUM leadership, steeped in 
the adversarial structures of the private industry, was uninterested in sharing the ‘traditional’ 
functions of management. NUM officials preferred instead to strengthen joint industrial bargaining 
and workplace consultation.29 This was in keeping with the broader opposition of Labour Party and 
trade union leaders to the extension of worker involvement in the organisation and management of 
industry, which some left intellectuals, notably Michael Young, saw as protecting rather than 
challenging class inequalities.30 
The initial tensions and only limited concrete changes that followed nationalisation are 
illustrated by the experience in Scotland. In the late 1940s and early 1950s the NCB’s early 
restructuring—seeking greater efficiencies in production—was conducted with minimal concern for 
the longer-term stability and collective interests of the localities and people affected by targeted 
disinvestment. Closures were first concentrated in the Shotts area of Lanarkshire, where a thousand 
                                                          
25
 Author calculations on data in J. N. Williamson, ‘The Years of Safety Work in a Scottish Colliery Group’, 
Transactions of the Institution of Mining Engineers, cvi (1946-47), 262; and National Coal Board, Report and 
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30
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jobs were lost between 1949 and 1953.31 The NCB helped miners and their families to relocate 
elsewhere in the coalfield, mainly in Fife. Community abandonment was implicit in this 
restructuring,32 but the genuine social and civic worries which arose were characterised by the NCB 
as the pessimism of ‘industrial psychologists and social science students’.33 Union as well as NCB 
officials were then startled by the scale and ferocity of workplace opposition to a second and longer 
phase of contraction after employment peaked in 1957. Resistance began in 1959 at Devon Colliery 
in Clackmannan, which the NCB decided to close on economic grounds. Devon workers attempted to 
resist this eventuality through strike action, picketing pits in Lanarkshire, West Lothian and Fife as 
well as Clackmannan.34 Within days the unofficial strike action involved 25,000 miners, a third of the 
total Scottish mining workforce. Abe Moffat, NUM Scottish Area (NUMSA) President, claimed in his 
memoir to have faced his members’ rebellion calmly, persuading the strikers to resume work in 
return for talks with the NCB’s Scottish directorate, thus establishing the miners’ right to 
consultation prior to closure.35 Devon remained open until the workforce could be transferred 
together to nearby Glenochil in 1960,36 but Moffat’s laconic account conceals the private 
consternation of the NUMSA executive, angered by the unofficial as well as large-scale nature of the 
anti-closure protest. Some executive members argued that the strike should have been ended 
without employment guarantee, so strong was their objection to the unofficial nature of the Devon 
workers’ resistance. This was seen as a breach of union discipline that would weaken the NUM’s 
broader and official campaign against closures.37 
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The crisis arising from the Devon closure highlights the connections between historical and 
generational change. Most generational accounts privilege the importance of formative experience, 
usually in the early years of adulthood. This is the approach adopted here, influenced in part by 
Mannheim’s model, well-known but still relevant, which identified generation and social class as 
twin elements in the construction of social identity. Mannheim argued that generations acquire their 
distinct identity from shared ‘concrete experience’, especially in the years of youth. These bonds are 
strengthened by experience of common social crisis or transformation, such as revolution, war or 
adapting this thinking to coal mining a major industrial ‘shock’ such as rapid economic restructuring 
and deindustrialisation.38 More recent historical scholarship has refreshed the value of generation as 
an analytical category. Two case-studies from the US illustrate this in different ways. In the first, 
Claudia Goldin adapted the concept of generation, using birth cohorts, to explain the limited 
elimination of gender-based inequalities in the US labour market over the course of the twentieth 
century. Education and family size were among the important factors that varied by birth cohort, 
and women matured ‘in different social climates’ as the century progressed: ‘These attributes are 
then carried with the cohort through time and distinguish it from the others with which it coexists’.39 
In the second, William Lyons and Robert Alexander also used generation to examine a long-run 
trend, the falling level of voting in US Presidential Elections. They showed that citizens born before 
1932, whose ‘primary socialization’ occurred during the New Deal and the Second World War, 
formed stronger party loyalties and ‘partisan thinking’ than those born after 1932, and were more 
likely to vote as a result.40 War and reconstruction as formative experience also feature in Mark 
Roseman’s study of coal mining in the Ruhr from 1945 to 1958. Post-Nazi economic order in the 
Ruhr was influenced by inter-generational tensions between younger miners and older union 
                                                          
38
 S. Aprile, M. de Oliveira and B. Touchelay, ‘Introduction’, in S. Aprile, M. de Oliveira, B. Touchelay and K. 
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officials, industry managers and policy-makers. Younger men, shaped by the various tribulations and 
traumas of military service and occupation, resisted authoritarian managerial entreaties to work 
harder for limited wages and rations, but were also pragmatic and less open to radical left politics 
than employers feared. They ‘had had enough shouting’, and contributed greatly to the incremental 
establishment of social partnership and workplace co-determination in the Ruhr, a key facet, it is 
widely accepted, in the Federal Republic of Germany’s economic ‘miracle’ of the later 1950s and 
1960s.41 
The confluence of political and industrial contingency in building the Ruhr’s ‘new’ generation 
after 1945, and the importance in the US case studies of differential socialisation experience in 
structuring generational expectations and ‘partisan thinking’,  have ready parallels in the twentieth-
century Scottish coalfields. Moffat was born in 1896 and joined the Communist Party of Great Britain 
(CPGB) in 1922. He was elected NUMSA President in 1945,42 and belonged to a generation of union 
officials across the coalfields—in England and Wales as well as Scotland—who were shaped as young 
men by the First World War and the industrial struggles of the 1920s. This cohort included 
Communists from South Wales, notably Arthur Horner (b. 1894) and Will Paynter (b. 1903), whose 
memoir, fittingly, was called My Generation.43 It also numbered important Labour figures from 
England, such as Will Lawther in Northumberland (b. 1889), and Sam Watson in Durham (b. 1898). 
These miners welcomed nationalisation in 1947 as an unambiguous victory. It was their ‘utopia’, 
according to David Hopper, General Secretary of the surviving Durham Miners’ Association in an 
interview recorded in the 2010s,44 and they were disinclined to articulate criticisms of ‘“their” 
industry’ after nationalisation, as Ben Curtis has recently put it when writing of South Wales.45 These 
miners were national figures in the labour movement in the 1940s and 1950s. Communist and 
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Labour alike, they vigorously cajoled union members to strive for ever-greater productivity, 
condemning unofficial strikes and absenteeism.46 In Scotland, a second generation of union leaders 
can be identified, born in the 1920s, with different formative experiences and political expectations, 
which was willing to criticise the nationalised industry more forcefully. It was this pressure that 
secured improvements in the manner in which restructuring affected the workers, as well as winning 
enhanced benefits for union members, including better wages. A third generation, born in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, carried another set of distinct experiences, attitudes and ambitions. As we 
shall see, members of this generation were quicker than the second generation to recognise the 
threats to the miners’ social democratic gains that were posed by Conservative policy and 
managerial anti-union initiatives in the 1980s. The strike of 1984–5, to protect union workplace 
rights as well as jobs and collieries, is presented within this framework of changing economic order 
as a movement shaped by generation as well as by class. 
 ‘Generation’ has been the approach used by Alan Campbell to examine ‘ideal types of 
orientation to trade unionism’ in Scottish coal mining, from the ‘independent collier’, born in the 
1820s, to the ‘bureaucratic reformist’, born in the late 1850s,  and then the ‘militant miner’, born 
around 1900.47 Campbell focuses on the pre-1939 period. Generation, as conceptualised in Table 1, 
explains the bridge from 1939 to 1947, from private to public ownership, and the important changes 
within the nationalised regime that followed from the 1950s to the 1970s, before the radical change 
of direction in the coalfields and broader economy in the 1980s. Table 1 introduces a further 
innovative feature of this analysis: the linking of trade union generations to distinct forms of 
economic unit. These over-lapped and co-existed, in chronological terms, but each represented an 
ideal-type in form when it first emerged. Taken together they illuminate the qualified changes in 
state macro-economic direction that were outlined in the introduction. Each of these ideal-type 
units represented an ever larger economy of scale, and substantial qualitative changes in coalfield 
                                                          
46
 H. Beynon and T. Austrin, ‘The Performance of Power: Sam Watson a Miners’ Leader on Many Stages’, 
Journal of Historical Sociology, xxviii (2015), pp. 458–90. 
47
 A. Campbell, The Scottish Miners, 1874–1939, II: Trade Unions and Politics (Aldershot, 2000), pp. 5–8. 
14 
 
employment. ‘Village Pits’, a designation adopted here, opened in the late nineteenth century, 
employed more than 500 miners on one site and were larger than most of their predecessors. Many 
survived for much of the twentieth century, but their relative importance was superseded in the 
1920s and 1930s by ‘New Mines’ a term adapted from an industry publicity film, discussed below, 
which employed more than a thousand miners. These were surpassed in importance from the late 
1950s by ‘Cosmopolitan Collieries’, each consisting of two thousand workers or more. 
‘Cosmopolitan’ was a term with spatial connotations used elsewhere in the UK coalfields. In South 
Wales it described pits which brought together a mix of workers who transferred in as other mines 
closed in the 1960s.48 In Scotland the term likewise implied an amalgamation of miners with very 
different geographical backgrounds and, at times, with highly differentiated prior experience in 
geological conditions and production methods. In this analysis it also refers to vintage and scale: 
Cosmopolitan Collieries opened after the peak of coal industry employment, generally in the 1960s, 
and were larger than New Mines. 
The connection between trade union generation and colliery type illustrates the importance 
of ‘primary socialisation’, to refer back to the study of US Presidential Election voting by Lyons and 
Alexander.49 The Rhondda, Will Payner wrote, was ‘the oven which moulded me into the kind of man 
I was to become’.50 Changes in the organisation of production shaped different patterns of industrial 
relations and political goals from one generation to the next. Just as successive cohorts of US women 
bore ‘attributes’ formed in early life that framed their later understanding and experience,51 
members of these Scottish mining generations made sense of developments as they aged on the 
basis of their initial adult experience. The construction of these formative experiences is summarised 
in Table 1. The political goal for each generation is treated as the sum of production regime plus 
transitional experience plus employment crisis. The table also includes the names of individual trade 
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unionists who were employed as young men in particular named units, each of which represents the 
changing ideal-types of the industry: the Moffats at Lumphinnans 11 and 12 in the 1920s, Michael 
McGahey at Cardowan in the 1940s, David Hamilton at Monktonhall and Iain Chalmers at Seafield in 
the 1970s. 
 
Table 1, Three Trade Union Generations in Scottish Coal Mining 
Generation 
Ideal-Typical 
Units and Trade 
Unionists 
Production 
Regime 
Transitional 
Experience 
Employment 
Crisis 
Political Goal 
Village Pit, 1890s 
Lumphinnans 
11&12, Bothwell 
Castle 3&4; 
Abe Moffat, Willie 
Allan 
Industrial 
concentration, 
private owners, 
employing 500-
1000 
First World War 
and October 
Revolution  
Lockouts of 1921 
and 1926 
Nationalisation: 
achieved 1947 
New Mine, 1920s 
Comrie, 
Cardowan; 
Michael 
McGahey, 
Lawrence Daly 
Fuller 
mechanisation, 
improved 
welfare, 
employing 1000+ 
Second World 
War, transition to 
nationalisation 
Pit closures of 
1950s 
Enhanced union 
‘voice’ in the 
Nationalised 
Industry 
Cosmopolitan 
Colliery, 1950s 
Monktonhall, 
Seafield; 
David Hamilton, 
Iain Chalmers 
Big reserves, 
power loading, 
employing 2000+ 
Closure of ‘local’ 
pits in 1960s 
Victorious 
National Pay 
disputes, 1972 
and 1974  
Defence of union 
‘voice’ and social 
democratic gains 
 
The three trade union generations operated within a cross-generational working-class 
movement in the Scottish coalfields. Union officials and activists at all times represented miners 
whose ages spanned four or five decades. This reinforces the importance of continuities over time. 
Just as in Roseman’s account of the Ruhr, in Scotland’s coalfields the workforce was recurrently 
‘recast’ with younger men who interacted with older men. The average age profile duly shows 
evidence of significant change from one generation to the next. This can be surmised from NCB 
personnel records, detailing the changing age profile of the workforce after nationalisation, 
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particularly when those records are read in conjunction with the figures charting changing 
employment levels shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2, Employment in Deep Coal Mining in Scotland and the UK (Thousands), Selected Years, 
1925-1987 
Year Scotland UK Scotland as % of Total 
1925 126.0 1078 11.7 
1932 82.3 796 10.3 
1947 77 707 10.9 
1957 82 710 11.5 
1967 32 390 8.2 
1977 21 248 8.5 
1987 6 75 8 
Sources: Alan Campbell, The Scottish Miners, 1874-1939. Volume One: Work, Industry and 
Community (Aldershot, 2000), pp. 22-3, 26; Department of Energy and Climate Change, Historical 
Coal Data: Coal Production, 1853 to 2014 (https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-
sets/historical-coal-data-coal-production-availability-and-consumption-1853-to-2011, accessed 20 
November 2015); W. Ashworth, The History of the British Coal Industry, Volume Five, 1946–1982: the 
nationalised industry (Oxford, 1986), pp. 672-5; Miles K. Oglethorpe, Scottish Collieries. An Inventory 
of the Scottish Coal Industry in the Nationalised Era (Edinburgh, 2006), p. 20. 
 
This data shows that the coal industry workforce in Scotland shrank by a third from the 1920s to the 
1930s, grew slightly in the 1940s and early 1950s, and then contracted: rapidly in the 1960s, slowly 
in the 1970s, and quickly again following the strike in 1984–5. NCB average age data, from William 
Ashworth’s official history, shows a correlation between falling overall employment and rising 
average age, until the 1970s.52 This data was not disaggregated by region, although it might be 
surmised that the average age in Scotland was generally slightly higher than in the rest of the UK 
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coalfield, given the correlation between falling employment and rising average age, and the slightly 
faster rate of job loss in Scottish mines than elsewhere after 1957. Across the NCB the average age 
was 39.7 years in 1948 and 40.5 years in 1957. At this point, the ‘average age miner’ was born in the 
mid-1910s and had been working in the industry since the mid-1930s. He, the ‘average age miner’, 
was just a few years older than the New Mine union generation which pushed for a more vigorous 
collective response to closures. As employment in the industry contracted, the average age gradually 
increased to 42.1 years in 1965, and peaked at 44.2 years in 1973–4. The trend then reversed, 
markedly, to 40.6 in 1978–9 and 38.7 in 1982–3.53 This reflected a concerted effort by the NCB to 
reduce its manpower through enhanced redundancy terms, in order to align production with 
demand, according to Ned Smith, its Director of Industrial Relations. This effort was concentrated on 
older miners, and relatively few men over the age of fifty were still employed by 1984. The younger 
age profile of the workforce was a crucial factor, Smith believed, in the strikers’ subsequent 
endurance.54 The ‘average age miner’ by this stage had been working for no more than twenty years, 
with his formative experiences coming in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the New Mine union 
generation had pressed the NCB successfully to bring the programme of closures and job cuts of that 
period to a halt, and had led successful collective action for improved wages in the 1972 and 1974 
national strikes.55 The average age miner was now just slightly older than the Cosmopolitan Colliery 
union generation, which compelled the New Mine generation to construct a collective response to 
the closures and job losses after 1979, and led the strike at workplace and community level in 1984–
5. 
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[II] 
The three union generations central to this analysis were formed by a mixture of experiences in early 
adulthood. In the case of the first of these generations, Abe Moffat and his brother Alex (b. 1903) 
lived in the Fife village of Lumphinnans, connecting Cowdenbeath to the west and Lochgelly to the 
east. In this conurbation, roughly three in four occupied men in the 1920s were employed by the Fife 
Coal Company, including the Moffats at Lumphinnans 11 and 12. The Moffats were sons of a coal 
miner, but as young men entered an industry which, in terms of its business organisation and 
production scale, differed from that of their father’s youth. Like others in the sector, notably the 
Alloa Coal Company, the Lothian Coal Company and the Wemyss Coal Company, the Fife Coal 
Company had in the 1890s and 1900s become connected to the larger worlds of Scottish, British and 
imperial capital through inter-locking directorships and commercial activity.56 Its Chairman from 
1923, Sir Adam Nimmo, was a former President of the Mining Association of Great Britain.57 This 
changing structural position had a major bearing on the formation of the Village Pit generation: 
expanding firms, larger units, and greater mechanisation reduced divisions between workers, who 
were stimulated to greater collective action on wages, conditions and the broader organisation of 
industry and society. Lumphinnans was one of three ‘Little Moscows’ identified in Stuart Macintyre’s 
analysis of inter-war working class militancy in Britain,58 and appears in a more recent survey of 
‘Small-Place Communism’ across Western Europe, comparable with Sallaumines in the Pas-de-Calais 
and Penzberg in Bavaria.59 In his memoirs, Abe Moffat attributed his personal radicalisation to village 
politics, the industrial culture and dangerous working conditions of the pits, and what he and many 
others who witnessed it as infantrymen saw as the purposeless slaughter of workers on the Western 
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Front in the First World War.60 Moffat’s action in joining the CPGB in 1922 reflected the local impact 
of the 1917 October Revolution, the anniversary of which was marked each year by the town council 
in nearby Cowdenbeath flying the Red Flag.61 
In Lanarkshire, Willie Allan (b. 1900) was Alan Campbell’s archetypal ‘militant miner’.62 His 
working life started in 1914 at Baird & Co.’s Craighead Colliery in Blantyre, near Hamilton. Allan was 
also radicalised by the war, by workplace and community experience, and by attendance at John 
Maclean’s Scottish Labour College classes in Glasgow, sponsored by the Lanarkshire Mineworkers’ 
Union. Allan joined the CPGB in 1923.63 Allan, the Moffats and others of the Village Pit generation 
were critical of older union leaders, calling for more combative negotiations with private owners.64 
The private coalfield order had been subjected to some state controls in the First World War, with 
the introduction of minimum national wage levels. In August 1918 the Miners’ Federation of Great 
Britain (MFGB) ,to which the Scottish district unions were affiliated, restated a pre-war demand for 
nationalisation, along with enhanced workplace representation and a standard fixed price for coal, 
with the aim of removing the destabilising effects of market forces on production and labour.65 This 
proposed transformation was resisted by the owners, shaping the conduct and outcomes of three 
major crises: a threatened strike in 1919, and then two lockouts, in 1921 and 1926. The owners 
avoided nationalisation in 1919, consolidated private ownership and managerial sovereignty in 1921, 
and secured a return to market-driven wages in 1926.66 During the lockouts, employers imposed 
substantial costs on their employees, with wage-rate cuts and longer working hours. Workers 
responded with forceful crowd actions, attacking mine property. Allan and the Moffat brothers were 
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among many arrested in 1926: Willie Allan was found not guilty of offences under the Conspiracy 
and Protection of Property Act; Abe was convicted and fined for leading ‘a riotous mob’; and Alex 
was imprisoned for two months under the government’s Emergency Regulations. Union activists 
were victimised afterwards, sacked by their employers and ‘blacklisted’ by other firms. Allan 
experienced this in 1921 and the Moffats in 1926. All three became checkweighers, elected and in 
effect employed by workers under Coal Mines legislation. When the Moffats led a local strike in 
1929, with such involvement being beyond their checkweighers’ purview, the Fife Coal Company 
successfully applied legal measures to have them removed. Abe did not work again in the coal 
industry until 1938.67 
The transition in the coalfields from Village Pit to New Mine in the 1930s was shaped by the 
crises of the 1910s and 1920s and the change in broader economic direction arising from the 
incremental growth of state action. While retaining control over their workplaces and workforces, 
mine owners—especially those in larger firms—responded to the changing competitive environment 
and new technological possibilities by establishing bigger units with greater mechanisation and new 
amenities for workers. The unintended consequences were enhanced worker solidarity, with further 
diminution of occupational hierarchies, and greater collective self-confidence arising from the 
improved environment. This trend was encouraged by government intervention, itself an indication 
of the type of gradual adjustment to macro-economic direction that blurs the boundaries between 
the inter-war liberal order and the post-1945 social democratic order. The 1926 Mining Industry Act, 
which can be seen as a response to the crises of 1921 and 1926, promoted larger aggregations of 
capital to secure more productive efficiency, and, through a levy on coal royalties, established the 
employers’ obligation to finance ‘accommodation and facilities for workmen taking baths and drying 
clothes’.68 More than fifty pithead baths in Scotland were established within a decade.69 Village Pits 
were redeveloped, and larger pits—the New Mines—were established with an innovative emphasis 
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on scale and welfare. The Fife Coal Company’s largest initiative was Comrie, opened in west Fife in 
1936. The New Mine, produced by Gaumont British Instructional Films in collaboration with the 
company, presented Comrie as an exemplar of a new emphasis on ‘safety, efficiency and economy’, 
with rigorous testing for firedamp, technologically-advanced cutting machinery and semi-
mechanised loading. The rural location was emphasised. Distant from housing, it was presented as a 
contribution to better living conditions, with workers being delivered to their workplace by bus. 
Amenities included showers, canteen and first aid room. The New Mine duly offered workers clear 
social improvement and greater esteem, to paraphrase Ross McKibbin.70 On a visit to Comrie in 
1946, Herbert Morrison, Labour’s Deputy Prime Minister, saw it as embodying a new society: ‘a 
painting of fifty years hence under nationalisation’.71 
Michael McGahey, NUMSA President from 1967 to 1987, was born in 1925, the son of Jimmy 
McGahey, a Communist who was imprisoned and sacked in 1926 for activities during the lockout.72 
Michael followed his father into the Lanarkshire pits and the CPGB, but an early act of generational 
independence was inspired by Cardowan, the largest New Mine in Lanarkshire, part owned by 
Nimmo of the Fife Coal Company.73 Employed at Gateside Colliery in Cambuslang, McGahey led an 
unofficial strike in September 1943 in solidarity with thirty-four Cardowan men who had been 
imprisoned after refusing to pay fines for illegal work stoppages under war-time emergency 
regulations. The Cardowan miners, like others in Scotland, were fighting their employer on a broad 
range of issues, including work allocation, bonus payments and safety questions.74 Workers 
elsewhere joined the Cardowan and Gateside men and for several days between 7,000 and 10,000 
miners across Lanarkshire, Stirlingshire and Dunbartonshire were on strike. The action ended after 
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union officials visited the apprehended miners in Barlinnie Prison in Glasgow, and arranged for their 
fines to be paid.75 This contrasted markedly with the famous strike one year earlier at Betteshanger 
in Kent, where mining union officials also negotiated the release of workers imprisoned under 
emergency regulations, but—unlike the Scottish officials—compelled the authorities to rescind the 
fines.76 Sacked for his role in the illegal strike action, McGahey was blacklisted by Lanarkshire 
employers and found work in the Lothians before returning ‘home’, after the war and 
nationalisation, to Cardowan.77 Memories of the 1920s conditioned the Village Pit generation’s view 
that nationalisation was a decisive victory. But McGahey, despite advancing through the NUMSA and 
the CPGB in the 1950s and working closely with Abe Moffat, developed a sharper critique of the 
nationalised industry, along with others of his generation, notably Lawrence Daly. Born in 1924, Daly 
was the son of a central Fife Communist miner, Jimmy, who had also been sacked in 1926. Daly 
joined the CPGB and worked at Glencraig, the largest surviving central Fife pit in the 1950s, where he 
was the NUM delegate. He expressed his generational independence by leaving the CPGB in 1956, 
shortly before the Soviet suppression of the popular uprising in Hungary, forming the Fife Socialist 
League and associating with the broader UK New Left before joining the Labour Party.78 
The role of the New Left in the Scottish coalfields should not be exaggerated. The CPGB 
retained the support of many leading union officials. But the critique of the NCB strategy and 
operations offered by the New Mine generation resembled the New Left dissatisfaction with the 
trajectory of public policy in post-1945 Britain: moderate wealth redistribution was not accompanied 
by any meaningful erosion of class privileges and inequalities.79 The ‘voice’ of manual workers, to 
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paraphrase Albert Hirschmann, was heard by policy-makers and employers on a narrow range of 
material questions only.80 In pursuit of greater communal security the New Mine generation 
articulated moral economy arguments more sharply than the Village Pit generation, and made 
particularly forceful representations at workplace level to enhance union voice in the nationalised 
industry. In large part this was a direct response to the NCB’s insensitive handling of closures in the 
early 1950s, and the Village Pit generation’s ineffectual opposition to this process. The New Mine 
generation’s moral economy framework comprised two core features: pit closures and job losses 
had to be negotiated with union representatives rather than imposed; and the loss of pits and 
employment could only be tolerated where the NCB invested in new pits, or alternative industrial 
employment in the coalfields was established by UK government regional assistance to private-
sector manufacturing firms.81 While the Village Pit generation accepted pit closures and only slow 
improvements in real wages, the New Mine Generation found them intolerable. More robust local 
responses to the second wave of closures were led by McGahey, who extracted greater concessions 
from NCB officials. Typical is the case of Hamilton Palace, closed in 1959, where analysis of 
redeployment records shows that 99 per cent of workers received job offers at other Lanarkshire 
collieries within three months of production ending.82 Enhanced redundancy terms incentivised 
older miners to leave the industry, preserving opportunities for younger men. In 1963 around 950 
men in Lanarkshire were paid off in this manner: A. Campbell, born on 31 December 1899, left 
Cardowan with £165 in July, and William Potter, born on 30 October 1898, left nearby Wester 
Auchengeich in May with £180.83 
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A similar pattern developed in central Fife, where the workforce had contracted from 11,000 
in 1956 to around 3,500 by 1965,84 at which point NCB officials sought to close the five remaining 
pits, including Lumpinnans 11 and 12, and Glencraig.85 Led by Lawrence Daly, union representatives 
resisted, stating the core prerequisites for closure: comprehensive, local redeployment,86 or 
comparable jobs in other industries.87 The NCB complied, working with UK government ministers 
and officials. First, the Labour government’s 1965 National Plan pledged enhanced regional 
assistance to stimulate manufacturing in the coalfields.88 The Scottish Development Department 
advised the Scottish Economic Planning Council that alternative industrial employment would be 
built up in the coalfields.89 Ministry of Labour officials indicated to the NCB that 6,400 additional jobs 
could follow in Fife in the next three years, 2,300 of these explicitly ‘for males’. Second, the NCB 
accelerated the development of Cosmopolitan Collieries. Seafield to the east, along with Solsgirth, 
Castlehill and Bogside to the west, servicing a massive coal-burning power station at Longannet, 
were to accommodate redundant miners seeking transfer.90 
This policy effort, stimulated by pressure from below, produced new work in engineering 
sectors and contributed to the overall stabilisation of industrial employment in the coalfields in the 
1960s, despite the significant net loss of coal jobs.91 Deindustrialisation was a managed process in 
these years, with policy-makers guiding new industrial employers to areas of significant job loss. The 
interventions of the 1964–70 Labour governments were particularly valuable, increasing markedly 
the state’s regional aid commitment. The consequence in Lanarkshire, for example, was a 
stabilisation of the combined share of male employment in coal, metals and engineering: 44.9 per 
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cent in 1961, and 44.6 per cent in 1971. Coal’s share of this employment fell from 9.3 per cent to 2.8 
per cent, but, boosted by regional aid start-ups, engineering’s share increased from 19.4 per cent to 
25.6 per cent.92 Furthermore, Table 2 shows that the loss of coal industry employment across 
Scotland decelerated in the decade from 1967. There was one highly contentious closure: the NCB 
decided not to continue with production at Michael, in east Fife, then Scotland’s largest colliery, 
after an underground fire killed nine miners and caused severe damage to tunnels and coal-faces in 
1967.93 But even in this unusual case employment considerations were prioritised. The Labour 
government made localised regional policy adjustments that within a year attracted a major new 
employer, the Distillers Company Limited.94 
Coal job losses after 1967 were stemmed by three factors. First, the NCB had achieved its 
goal of greater mechanisation, with power-loaded production increasing from 39.6 per cent in 1961 
to 78.4 per cent in 1966, and consolidated to 85.9 per cent in 1971 and 90.1 per cent in 1974.95 
Second, employment alternatives to coal were dwindling as industrial diversification also stalled. 
This shaped the third factor—even sterner union opposition to closures, structured by a further act 
of generational power transfer within the NUMSA. Alex Moffat had succeeded Abe as President in 
1961. Shortly before retiring in March 1967, he persuaded an NUMSA Delegate Conference that 
additional closures on economic grounds would safeguard a smaller but more viable industry. Within 
three months, under the direction of Michael McGahey, the NUMSA abandoned this position, 
pledging to protect remaining coalfield employment on social as well as economic grounds.96 As late 
as November 1968 the NCB was privately advising officials at the Department of Economic Affairs 
that employment in Scotland’s pits would be dropping from around 36,000 to 24,700 by March 
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1971.97 New Mine generation pressure then compelled the government and the NCB to stabilise 
production. Measures adopted included the establishment of Longannet, along with other large 
coal-fired power stations in central and eastern Scotland.98 Jobs were lost in Scottish coal at less 
than half the overall NCB rate from 1969 to 1972, when almost 30,000 miners were still employed in 
Scotland.99 
The new units of the 1960s, the Cosmopolitan Collieries, shaped the formation of another 
distinct union generation. Its members attained maturity in the acute crisis of the early 1970s: the 
national wage disputes, the resultant improvement in miners’ earnings, and coal’s stronger relative 
position within the wider energy mix. In a longer historical perspective, these victories, involving 
confrontation between the NUM and Edward Heath’s Conservative government, are generally seen 
as an important preface to the year-long strike of 1984–5. 100 But they should also be understood as 
a coda to the restructuring of the late 1950s and 1960s, which provided a more stable employment 
position and boosted the miners’ future confidence.101 This was the experience of Iain Chalmers of 
Cowdenbeath (b. 1952). After leaving school he worked at Seafield, a Cosmopolitan Colliery in 
Kirkcaldy in Fife, which opened in 1966, travelling daily with men transferred from the older pits that 
had closed. The Little Moscows culture survived in this new environment, shaping the solidarity of 
the 1972 and 1974 victories and a pattern of relatively stable workplace relations between miners 
and managers. Chalmers, a Communist in the 1970s and 1980s, saw the political effects of Seafield’s 
enlarged scale as complicated. When reflecting on the strike of 1984–5 in an interview conducted in 
2009, Chalmers contended that those who came from communities of mixed occupations were less 
committed to industrial action than those from the older central Fife settlements.102 The effects of 
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the movement away from local pits were experienced by trade unionists elsewhere. In joining the 
industry, familial connection was as important to the Cosmopolitan Colliery generation as it had 
been to the Village Pit and New Mine generations. In Midlothian, David Hamilton left school in 1965, 
aged fifteen. He became a miner, like his father and two elder brothers. The four men initially 
worked at different pits, spreading the family risk of accident and unemployment. When David’s 
workplace closed, he moved to the Nottinghamshire coalfield, but he disliked the social hierarchies 
where miners addressed overseers as ‘sir’. In his ‘composed’ narrative,103 articulated some forty 
years later, Hamilton contrasted what he remembered as the deferential social relations of 
Nottinghamshire, where 90 per cent of miners worked throughout the 1984–5 strike,104 with the 
ostensibly more egalitarian relations of the Scottish coalfields. These relations were part of the social 
democratic order that Hamilton re-entered as a young adult on returning to Scotland after a year in 
Nottinghamshire, and sought to defend in 1984–5. He worked at Monktonhall, a Cosmopolitan 
Colliery south-east of Edinburgh, participating as a union branch committee member in the victories 
of 1972 and 1974, having joined the CPGB. In 1976 he became NUM delegate at Monktonhall, where 
generational change was strongly evident. The union branch committee was referred to as ‘the 
Young Team’, and by 1984 the delegate of the craftsmen’s union, Scottish Colliery, Enginemen, 
Boilermen and Tradesmen’s Association (SCEBTA), was Rab Amos (b. 1948), another Communist.105 
Amos had worked at the Village Pit of Easthouses, which opened in 1909 and closed in 1969, starting 
at Monktonhall in 1966. Hamilton and Amos represented miners drawn from a large crescent-
shaped area around the southern and eastern perimeter of Edinburgh, from ‘the Hills’ of Midlothian 
to the inland and waterfront villages of East Lothian.106 
The lost local pits and subsequent spatial mix of workers in enlarged units were important to 
the formation of the Cosmopolitan Colliery generation. Its members had entered the world of 
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mining during a period of major transformation: substantial closures and job losses, but within the 
framework of joint industrial agreements and broader economic security. This generation, boosted 
also by the victories of 1972 and 1974, was therefore confident about the future, accustomed to 
employment in large pits with substantial workable reserves, but also wary, given the lost pits and 
jobs which had been traded for the seven Cosmopolitan Collieries that had been established across 
Scotland. Each of these employed more than 2,000 miners, and collectively they produced 75 per 
cent of Scottish output by 1982.107  
At this point, however, there was an important anti-union turn in the Scottish coalfields, as 
NCB managers responded aggressively to changes initiated by the UK government. The coalfield 
order was being reconstructed once more. Margaret Thatcher’s government was seeking cheaper 
electricity, pressing the publicly-owned generating companies to secure lower costs through 
increasing the share of oil, gas, nuclear power and imported coal within the broader energy mix, 
while forcing down the price of NCB supply. The government had introduced the 1980 Coal Industry 
Act, which established the goal of withdrawing the NCB’s public subsidy by 1984.108 This was 
accompanied by a further important strategic shift in economic direction: the government’s 
ambition to erode labour power.109 The new macro-economic environment influenced the micro-
managerial approach from 1981 of the NCB’s Scottish Area Director, Albert Wheeler, who 
incrementally destabilised the social democratic order with a powerful emphasis on individual pit-
level performance. He chaired quarterly accountability meetings, requiring pit managers to explain a 
range of economic indicators: saleable output, productivity, costs of materials and electricity, and 
manpower.110 Union workplace representatives were targeted as obstacles to achieving production 
targets, rather than being seen as partners in a shared industrial enterprise. Workers were 
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demoralised as investment in new coal faces was cut or abandoned; joint industrial practices—
allowing unions a share in the organisation of production—were unilaterally jettisoned, literally torn 
up in front of David Hamilton, and thrown into a wastepaper basket by his colliery manager.111 
Full-time union officials of the New Mine generation area, including McGahey, were keenly 
aware of the dangers to their members of the Thatcher government’s economic strategy, but 
initially at least were surprised by the NCB’s anti-union turn. Willie Clarke, an NUM branch official at 
Seafield, remembers that he and other workplace representatives had to persuade McGahey and 
the union’s Scottish leadership that Wheeler’s changes in themselves represented a serious 
industrial relations emergency.112 Pits closed despite local opposition for the first time since the 
1960s. These included Cardowan, the Lanarkshire New Mine of the 1920s, in 1983, where over 1,400 
were employed.113 The average age of this pit’s workforce was 39, matching the national trend. 
Problems at Cardowan were symptomatic of the unfolding broader crisis. Nicky Wilson, a member of 
the Cosmopolitan Colliery generation, was Cardowan’s SCEBTA delegate and recalls the anger of the 
younger men. With few local job alternatives, as the new economic strategy accelerated 
deindustrialisation, the Cardowan workers were offered transfer to the Longannet complex, a 
distance from home to work of between thirty and forty miles for most of the pit’s employees. The 
alternative was unemployment.114 Members of the Cosmopolitan Colliery generation in 1984–5 
compelled their elders to act—just as the New Mine generation had pushed the Village Pit officials 
three decades earlier—and to seek the protection of pits and jobs through strike action. This was, 
therefore, a movement of youth, as well as class, in defence of the industry’s social democratic 
features.115 Margaret Thatcher’s characterisation of the strike, ‘Mr Scargill’s Insurrection’,116 was 
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misdirected. The core issue, as Raymond Williams put it, was the character of ‘social order’ in 
Britain.117 In seeking the elimination of the union voice from strategic decisions about investment, 
jobs and pit closures, the government understood this.118 The year-long dispute, experienced by 
many in the Scottish coalfields as an extended and disastrous act of violence, inflicted by hostile 
external forces, resulted in defeat for the strikers.119 The trend to authoritarian management and 
deindustrialisation that triggered the strike was confirmed emphatically in its aftermath. At Comrie, 
Fife’s single surviving New Mine, only one miner broke the strike between March 1984 and February 
1985.120 Production ended there in September 1986.121 There were only three collieries working in 
Scotland after 1990; by 2002 there were none. This rundown was imposed by managerial fiat, with 
limited alternative economic activity and employment available in the coalfields, and no attempt by 
government—as there had been from the 1950s to 1970s—to balance job losses with regional 
policy-assisted alternatives. Instead, the social security system was used to incentivise older miners 
to withdraw from economic activity altogether on grounds of disability, obscuring the ‘real’ level of 
unemployment in ex-coal localities, which was often double the official figure given for 
unemployment benefit claimants.122  This perhaps cushioned slightly the material impact of 
deindustrialisation on older former miners, but the long-term consequence of heavy employment 
losses in the coalfields was unambiguous: ingrained economic and social deprivation.123 David 
Hamilton was sacked by the NCB in 1985, one of 200 or so Scottish miners, mainly younger men, 
who were victimised in this manner.124 These included Michael McGahey’ son, also Michael 
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McGahey, a miner at Midlothian’s other Cosmopolitan Colliery, Bilston Glen.125 Like the Village Pit 
and New Mine generations before them, the Cosmopolitan Colliery men who led the strike in 1984–
5 were blacklisted by industrial employers in the years that followed.126 
 
[III] 
Changes in economic direction were incremental across the twentieth century in Britain, and seldom 
absolute. But broad trends can be discerned: there was a movement away from liberalism and 
towards social democracy from the 1940s to the 1970s; and back from social democracy in the 
direction of liberalism once more in the 1980s. Inequality narrowed in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century, in the context of the social democratic turn, but then grew rapidly in the 1980s, 
partly by policy design, and largely also as a consequence of a marked change in the management of 
deindustrialisation. The extent of these changes, and the manner in which they occurred, have been 
examined in this case-study of Scottish coal. Nationalisation in 1947 was prefigured to some extent 
by a shift towards industrial concentration and corporatist government intervention in the 1920s 
and 1930s. The success of nationalisation was not immediate in the 1940s; nor did it flow in a 
straightforward manner from the legislative and institutional structures established by the 1945 
Labour government. Nationalisation was a dynamic process, with three identifiable phases: the early 
years of restructuring, with substantial closures and job losses in the 1950s; the effort made by 
mining unions to construct communal security in the 1960s, compelling NCB investment in the 
Cosmopolitan Collieries and state-assisted industrial diversification; and the defence of this new 
position in the 1970s and early 1980s. The strikers’ defeat in 1984–5 marked an important, perhaps 
even decisive, movement in Britain’s economic direction. The trend to deindustrialisation—visible 
from the peak of employment in coal in 1957—rapidly accelerated, but without the policy measures 
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applied in the 1960s and 1970s to direct alternative industrial jobs to the coalfields. This was partly 
because trade unions, which in the 1960s and 1970s had been influential in persuading the 
government to direct industry to areas of heightened unemployment, , were no longer recognised 
by the state as a legitimate partner in policy-making. A significant fall in industrial employment 
resulted in the 1980s, a powerful stimulus to the rapid growth of inequality in income distribution. 
The analysis presented here links this process of contested economic development to 
generational change in the coalfields. Three distinct generations were formed by, and operated 
within, dynamic and sometimes highly conflictual material worlds: of class, gender and family; of 
workplace, neighbourhood and social network; and of political campaigning and economic activity. 
Predominant types of industrial unit in the coalfields played a key role: the evolution of ownership, 
scale, and methods of production all contributed to the emergence across time of three recognisably 
different generations of coal miners and union representatives. The Village Pit generation, born in 
the 1890s, encountered acute class conflict in early adult life in the 1910s and 1920s. This 
conditioned a commitment to industrial transformation, to the removal of private employers and to 
the establishment of public ownership, thereby enabling the workers to share the regulation of their 
mines with management. The Village Pit generation saw nationalisation as a great victory, and only 
gradually recognised its shortcomings. The New Mine generation, born in the 1920s with childhood 
memories of the lockouts and victimisations that followed, experienced the disappointments of 
nationalisation far more acutely as young adults. This strengthened an ambition to secure a more 
stable economic future and a guarantee of consultation in instances when pit closures and job losses 
were being considered. The New Mine generation attained leadership of the NUMSA in the mid-
1960s: there were no closures in the face of workforce opposition after Michael shut in 1967 until 
the early 1980s. The Cosmopolitan Colliery generation, born in the 1950s, began its working life in 
mines that opened in the 1960s or had been substantially redeveloped by the NCB since the 1950s. 
These facilities represented resources that the youngest of the three generations believed to be 
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sustainable—and therefore defendable—when the UK government sought in the 1980s to transform 
the coalfield order once more, within a more general change of economic direction. 
There were continuities, clearly, from one generation to the next. All three generations 
operated within a cross-generational working-class movement, and engaged in similar struggles to 
express a meaningful trade union voice and obtain justice in the workplace. The Moffats were 
sacked and victimised in the 1920s, as was Michael McGahey in the 1940s and David Hamilton in the 
1980s. Yet the detailed circumstances surrounding these ostensibly similar experiences reinforce the 
value of thinking about the changing order of the Scottish coalfields—and shifts in the economic 
direction of Britain more broadly—in generational terms. The Moffats were forced out of the coal 
industry by the Fife Coal Company. Their employer was a prominent capitalist enterprise, seeking to 
maximise profits in a period of intense competition by controlling the costs of production.. For the 
company, this effort involved excluding union influence from the workplace. McGahey was exiled 
from Lanarkshire during the transition from private to public ownership. His actions in defence of 
the workplace right to strike transgressed the Second World War compact between the state, the 
employers and his own union, which, following the election of the Labour government in 1945, 
contributed to the nationalisation of coal in 1947. Hamilton’s career in the coal industry was ended 
by the Conservative government’s anti-trade union turn of the 1980s, a vital element in the strategic 
shrinking of the state’s economic commitments. This decisive change in macro-economic direction 
led to the dismantling of the social democratic coalfield order that McGahey’s generation had 
constructed on the basis of the public ownership secured by the Moffats’ generation. Evidence from 
the Scottish coalfields thus illustrates the rich value of generational analysis in enhancing 
understanding of the contested nature of macro-economic change in Britain from the 1920s to the 
1980s. 
 
